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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WYOMING UNDERGROUND WATER STATUTE

The Wyoming Legislature enacted an underground water statute in 1947
which provides that the reasonable use of all underground water in the State is a
matter of public interest1 and that no interference will be permitted with any
existing right to such waters when beneficially and economically applied. 2 The
statute requires that those who have developed underground water must file data
concerning same.3 The State Engineer is then empowered to determine the scope
of underground water formations, and to give notice of his findings to the State
Board of Control, who will adjudicate the rights of the users. 4 After hearings
and gathering of proof by the Board, a record of priorities of appropriation shall
5
be made and certificates shall be issued to all water users.
Although the Wyoming act has not been judicially contested, similar legislation has been subjected to constitutional objections in the courts of other states.
It is the purpose of this paper to determine, in the light of constitutional provisions
and judicial decisions applicable both in Wyoming and in other States where the
question has arisen, the validity of the act under consideration.
The applicable Wyoming constitutional provisions are that "The water of all
natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the porperty of the State," 6 and subse1. Wyo. Sess. Laws 1947 c. 107 sec. 1.

2. Id. at sec 2.
3. Id at sec. 5.

4. Id. at sec. 9.
5. Ibid.

6. Wyo. Const. Art. VIII, sec. 1.

NOTES

quent provisions placed the power of supervision 7 and the power of control8 over
"waters" of the State in the State. It is also provided that priority of appropriation for beneficial use shall give the better right.9
Inasmuch as it has been said that the declaration of either the court or the
legislature as to the use and ownership of waters constitutes a vested right, it is
well to broadly review the various precepts which the courts have applied in this
regard. There are four possible rules concerning the use of underground waters.
The English Rule is that which holds that the landowner has an absolute ownership in underlying percolating waters and a right to extract such water at will.10
The American or Reasonable Use Rule provides that the landowner's right to
take water from the underground basin is not unlimited, but is based on the
rights of his neighbor to use same. 11 The rule of Correlative Rights provides that
the landowner's right to use underground water is determined by the measure that
his surface land bears to the amount of underground water available, both as to his
needs and the needs of others. 12 The rule of Prior Appropriation is an application
of the same principle applicable to surface waters.13
In the Wyoming case of Hunt v. City of LaramielM the dispute involved the
right to the surface water flowing from an artificially developed spring as between
the landowner upon whose land the water had been developed and an adjoining
landowner upon whose land the water also flowed. The Supreme Court held that
the waters in question were not subject to the law of appropriation contended for
by the adjoining landowner, inasmuch as they had been developed by digging into
the subsurface formation. The court said that "percolating water developed artificially by excavation and other artificial means

. . .

belong to the owner of the

land upon which they are developed." 15
Due to the Hunt decision, it has been said that Wyoming follows the English
Rule in respect to the use of underground waters. 16 If that were true, the statute
under consideration would likely be attacked on the ground that it is violative of
the Wyoming constitutional provisions that "no person shall be deprived of . . .
property without due process of law," 17 and that "private property shall not be
taken ...

for public or private use without just compensation."18

It is significant that in the case which announced the English Rule the landowner there sued had deepened his mine equipment below the depth of his neighbor's equipment, causing the common water table to lower to the detriment of
the neighbor.19 In the Hunt case the dispute involved the right to the waters on
Wyo. Const. Art. VIII, sec. 2.
Wyo. Const. Art. I, sec. 31.
Wyo. Const. Art. I, sec. 33.
Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843).
Note, 1 Wyo. L. J. 114 (1947).
Id. at 115.
Ibid.
Hunt v. City of Laramie, 26 Wyo. 160, 181 Pac. 137 (1919).
Id. at 169, 181 Pac. at 140.
Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West 264
(U. S. Dep't Agric. 1942); Note, 1 Wyo. L. J. 116 (1947).
17. Wyo. Const. Art. I, sec. 6.
18. Wyo. Const. Art. I, sec. 33.
19. Acton v. Bundell, supra note 10.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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the surface after they had been artificially developed by digging at a shallow
depth.20 An analysis of the Hunt case may prove that the waters there involved
were developed waters, which represent an increase in the surface supply, and
which are so developed that the flow of a natural spring is increased as a result of
the improvement by artificial means.2 1 Such improvements result in adding water
to a source of supply, such as a stream, and also result in the acceleration of the
flow of water which would have reached the stream in any event but at a later
time.22 It has been held that one who actually develops a new supply of water has
the first right to its use.2 3 Thus it could be strongly contended that the Wyoming
court in the Hunt case was not applying the English Rule, but rather the rule
applicable to developed waters.
The courts of other States which have adopted the prior-appropriation of
underground water doctrine have been confronted with many of the problems of
constitutionality confronting the Wyoming statute.
The constitutional provision of Utah reads that "All existing rights to the
use of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose are
hereby recognized and confirmed."2 4 The Utah Supreme Court in 1900 held that
percolating water in privately owned land is not public water and hence not
subject to appropriation. 25 The same rule was subsequently upheld. 26 An 1880
statute2 7 was amended in 1933 to read that "All waters in . . . this State

whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the
public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof." 2 8 This statute was directly
in issue when the case of Wrathall v. Johnson2 9 was decided. The court pointed
out that the constitutional provision made no exceptions as to surface, subterranean or percolating waters, and stated that "If there is no movement of this so-called
'percolating water', there is no controversy; it is simply there and not a subject
of appropriation under any meaning given to the law. .

.

. However, if there is

movement of water through the soil, be it ever so slow it is usually found by
tracing it from the immediate source of supply through the feeders to the ultimate
source." 30 The court construed the statute by interpreting it thus: The waters of
streams ...

or other sources of supply ...

whether or not flowing above or under

the ground in known or defined channels, etc. 31 The court said that because a
lake, a stream, a saturated area, an artesian basin, or other source of supply is
under the ground does not exclude it from other source of supply. One concurring
Justice disagreed with this theory on the ground that inasmuch as the court had
previously declared underground water to be the absolute property of the land20. Hunt v. City of Laramie, supra note 14.
21. State Water Law in the Development of the West 23 (National Resources
Planning Board 1943).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Utah Const. Art. XVII, see. 1.
25. Willow Creek Irrigation Co. v. Michaelson, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 943 (1900).
26. See Home v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 59 Utah 279, 202 Pac. 815 (1921).
27. Laws of Utah 1880, c. 20, sec. 6.
28. Utah Code Ann. 1943, Vol. 5, sec. 100-1-1.
29. Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. (2d) 755 (1935).
30. Id. at 764.
31. Id. at 779.

NOTES
owner it may have even then been too late for legislative action declaring such

waters to be publicly owned under the police power. He declared that it would be
a taking of private property without compensation and seriously unsettle rights
which had become vested. 32
In the light of the Wrathall decision and the liberal interpretation which the
Utah court applied to the statute there, it would seem that the same court would
have less difficulty in upholding the Wyoming statute, inasmuch as the Wyoming
constitution placed the power of supervision and the power of control over
"waters" of the State in the State. It is probably true that the Utah decision
amounted to judicial law making inasmuch as the English Rule had twice pre33
viously been declared by the court as applicable to private property.
The New Mexico constitution, after declaring all existing rights to the use
of waters of the state for beneficial purpose confirmed, 34 provides that the unappropriated water of every "natural stream, perrennial or torrential, within the
State ... is hereby declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation .... "35 In a 1930 case,3 6 it was argued that the statutory and constitutional
inclusion of specific waters, as subject to appropriation, amounted to an exclusion
of all other waters. The court rejected this argument, stating that "The declaration of both courts and legislature, and, subsequently of the Constitution, that
priority of appropriation should determine the right to the use of the waters of
running streams, did not necessarily exhaust the principles underlying such declarations ....
Legislatures indeed adopt general laws for future application, but,
practically, only as situations develop requiring legislative action." 3 7 The court
disposed of the vested rights argument by pointing out that the claimed right to
the underground water had never been declared in that jurisdiction, and that the
English Rule was not applicable to conditions in that State. That the question
as to the exclusiveness of the enumerated waters is unsettled in Wyoming was
brought out in a 1935 case when the court said that ". . . The Legislature, even if
it could lawfully do so, has not attempted to go beyond the terms of the Constitution, and has made no provision for the appropriation of waters other than those
mentioned in the Constitution. "38
The Constitutional provision of Colorado declares only the water of every
natural stream to be public water subject to appropriation.3 9 Notwithstanding
the fact that the Constitution and statutes of that State have apparently limited
the priority of appropriation system to the waters of natural streams, whether surface or subterranean, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that the same law and
the same rules apply to the appropriation of underground waters which are not
Id. at 801.
See note 25, supra.
N. M. Const. Art. 16, sec. 1 (Bobbs-Merrill 1941).
N. M. Const. Art. 16, sec. 2 (Bobbs-Merrill 1941.).
Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N. M. 611, 286 Pac. 970 (1930) (reversed on procedural
ground).
37. Id. at 973.
38. See State v. Hiber, 48 Wyo. 172, 44 P. (?d) 1005, 1008 (1935).
39. Colo. Const., Art. XVI, sec. 5.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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and cannot be a part of a natural stream.40 While this holding also apparently
amounts to judicial law making, it would seem that under the circumstances a like
holding under the Wyoming Constitution would be nothing more than a liberal
interpretation.
The words "other collections of still water" which appear in the Wyoming
constitutional provision concerning the enumeration of certain waters as the
property of the State4l have not been construed. Inasmuch as these words follow
the word "lakes" an argument may be put that the constitutional draftsmen intended that by the injection of these words, percolating waters42 were to be
included, as distinguished from waters flowing in defined subterranean streams. 4 3
The latter waters have universally been held to be appropriable on the grounds
that they are underflows or subflows of a surface stream, flowing in known and
defined channels.4 While it has been said that all ground waters are generally
in motion, flowing through the interstices of the soil as a result of geological conditions and hydrostatic forces, 45 nevertheless, percolating waters, particularly
those collected behind impervious stratum, are relatively "still" as compared to
ground waters flowing in defined subterranean streams, in much the same way
that lake water is still as compared to waters of a surface stream.
From the foregoing considerations, it would seem that, given a liberal constitutional construction as distinguished from a strict construction, the act under
consideration is valid.
JAMES

E.

BARRETr

CAN Co-LEssEEs UNDER AN OIL AND GAS LEASE COMPEL

A

PARTITION IN

KIND?

In regard to the rights of parties holding undivided interests in fee simple
to the surface and minerals, or minerals only, it is well settled that if there is no
known oil and gas in the premises, a partition in kind may be granted to a cotenant,l and it has been held that even though there was a possibility of the existence of oil and gas, a partition in kind may be granted where there was no evidence
of injury to a co-tenant as the result of the partition. 2 Generally, if a partition
in kind would result in an injury to one or more of the co-tenants, partition will
40. Ripley v. The Park Center Land and Water Company, 40 Colo. 129, 90 Pac.
75 (1907) ; Dalpez v. Nix, 96 Colo. 540, 45 P. (2d) 176 (1935).

41. Wyo. Conts. Art. VIII, see. 1.
42. Hutchins, supra Note 16, at 152 (percolating waters are waters in ground
channels still undefined and unknown).
43. Ibid (waters flowing in known and defined underground channels having
characteristics of surface watercourses).
44.

Ibid.

45. Id. at 146.
1. Henderson v. Chesley, 273 S. W. 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Collier v.
Collier, 184 Okla. 38, 84 P. (2d) 603 (1938); Wolfe v. Stanford, 179 Okla. 27,
64 P. (2d) 335 (1937); Wight v. Ingram-Day Lumber Company, 196 Miss.
823, 17 So. (2d) 196 (1944).
2. Tuggle v. Davis, 292 Ky. 27, 165 S. W. (2d) 844 (1942).

